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Network infrastructures are essential for the distribution of resources such as electricity and water.
Typical strategies to assess their resilience focus on the impact of a sequence of random or targeted
failures of network nodes or links. Here we consider a more realistic scenario, where elements fail
based on their usage. We propose a dynamic model of transport based on the Bak-Tang-Wiesenfeld
sandpile model where links fail after they have transported more than an amount µ (threshold) of
the resource and we investigate it on the square lattice. As we deal with a new model, we provide
insight on its fundamental behavior and dependence on parameters. We observe that for low values
of the threshold due to a positive feedback of link failure, an avalanche develops that leads to
an abrupt collapse of the lattice. By contrast, for high thresholds the lattice breaks down in an
uncorrelated fashion. We determine the critical threshold µ∗ separating these two regimes and show
how it depends on the toppling threshold of the nodes and the mass increment added stepwise to
the system. We find that the time of major disconnection is well described with a linear dependence
on µ. Furthermore, we propose a lower bound for µ∗ by measuring the strength of the dynamics
leading to abrupt collapses.
PACS numbers: 64.60.ah, 64.60.an, 05.65.+b
I. INTRODUCTION
Economy increasingly relies on network-like infrastruc-
tures whose failures are costly such as power grids, wa-
ter supply networks, public transportation systems, road
networks, and the Internet [1–3]. Models to assess and
quantify their resilience are more important than ever.
The traditional approach monitors how sequences of fail-
ures of network nodes or links impact the global connec-
tivity. For simplicity, these sequences have been drawn
randomly [4–7], based on topological properties (mali-
cious attacks) [8, 9], or according to the dynamics of cas-
cading [10, 11]. Different from that, we propose a model
where links age, and thus they fail based on their cumu-
lative usage.
The dynamics of transport on a network can often be
described by spatial load correlation. For example, a
traffic jam in one avenue is likely to trigger congestion
in neighboring roads. Similarly, one overloaded power
station is typically surrounded by others working at full
power [12]. Also, when a reservoir overspills, it is very
likely to trigger the spilling over of other reservoirs down-
stream [13]. To grasp such spatial and temporal corre-
lation in a simple manner, we consider the Bak-Tang-
Wiesenfeld (BTW) sandpile model [14], where the iter-
ative addition of sand grains on network nodes triggers
avalanches of sand that propagate through the system.
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The BTW model is among the simplest models exhibit-
ing cascading dynamics which self-organize into a critical
state [15–17]. Because infrastructures are geographically
embedded graphs, we will consider a square lattice, be-
cause the properties of the BTW and similar models on
it have been studied extensively [14, 18–23]. Power-law
distributions of avalanches, as the ones predicted by the
BTW model, have been observed in several physical net-
works such as electrical power grids [24], water reservoir
networks [13], and neural networks [25, 26].
Only if no material is lost during avalanches, i.e., at
dissipation rate ε = 0, the dynamics is critical such that
one finds a power-law avalanche size distribution [27]. For
ε > 0, there is an exponential cutoff in the avalanche size
distribution at a characteristic size, such that the like-
lihood of avalanches larger than this characteristic size
is negligible. The dynamics therefore is said to be sub-
critical. Here, we only consider ε > 0 but, due to a
positive feedback through link failures, we systematically
find avalanches larger than this characteristic size. When
links fail sufficiently fast, the lattice collapses abruptly
at a certain time due to a single avalanche. The size of
this avalanche is of the size of the lattice due to a self-
amplifying mechanism, and it is much larger than the size
of any other observed avalanche. It is therefore an out-
lier similar to the so called “Dragon-Kings” found across
various fields [28].
Our model, where links fail due to cumulative us-
age, has similarities with fracture, random fuse (RFM),
[29, 30] and fiber bundle models (FBM) [31, 32] where
nodes (fuses and fibers) fail due to cumulative damage
[33–36]. Due to spatial load correlation (RFM) and load
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2redistribution (FBM), such systems undergo abrupt fail-
ure if the strength of nodes is narrowly distributed com-
pared to an uncorrelated gradual fracture otherwise. In
our model the analogy to the load is the usage of links
which triggers link failure. Since avalanches are spatially
embedded, there is spatial usage correlation. Further-
more, similar to the local load sharing FBM, the failure
of links can immediately enhance the usage in their neigh-
borhood, inducing a positive feedback of link failure. De-
pending on the strength of this positive feedback, we also
find either an abrupt collapse or a gradual destruction.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we intro-
duce the model. Results are presented in Sec. III and we
draw conclusions in Sec. IV.
II. MODEL
We consider a square lattice with periodic boundary
conditions i.e., we have N = L2 nodes with initially 2L2
links. Each node i carries an amount of mass zi which
can be transferred to other nodes through links. Nodes
topple if their mass zi is larger or equal the toppling
threshold zc, which we set equal to the initial degree of
the nodes (zc = 4). A toppling of node i leads to mass
being distributed equally among its connected neighbors
j. Every mass transfer from node i to node j is added to
the usage uij of the link in between. We have
if zi ≥ zc :
1. for all nodes j linked to node i:
zj → zj + zi
ki
(1− ε),
uij → uij + zi
ki
(1− ε),
2. zi → 0,
where ki is the degree of the toppling node and the rate
of dissipation ε = 0.01, unless otherwise stated. One top-
pling node can trigger the toppling of neighboring nodes
what might lead to a cascade of topplings. Each sequence
of toppling nodes is considered an avalanche whose size
s is defined as the number of nodes that toppled at least
once during the avalanche. Initially every node is as-
signed a random mass zi uniformly distributed on [0, zc).
Then increments of mass ∆z = 1 are iteratively added
to randomly chosen nodes, which eventually trigger the
toppling of nodes. Relaxation occurs on a much shorter
time scale than external perturbations, i.e., only when
an avalanche ends, the next increment of mass is added.
Before we allow links to fail, we first reach the stationary
state where one finds a power-law avalanche size distribu-
tion truncated by an exponential cutoff at a characteristic
avalanche size, as well known for this sandpile model with
ε > 0 [27]. Note that this characteristic size is smaller
than L2 for the values of L and ε considered here.
After reaching the stationary state we set the time t =
0, reset all uij = 0, and introduce a failing threshold µ
Figure 1. (Color online) Link failing time (top) and fail-
ing order (bottom) for the two different regimes for
a single sample. For µ < µ∗ (µ = 100) after the failure of a
minor fraction of links, one devastating avalanche destroys the
entire network at once (top left) with the damage propagat-
ing radially outwards (bottom left). By contrast, for µ > µ∗
(µ = 105) each avalanche only destroys a minor fraction of
links and no long range correlation in failing time (top right)
and order (bottom right) can be observed. tmin and tmax de-
note the time of the first and the last failed link respectively.
Results were obtained on a square lattice of L = 512, with
dissipation rate ε = 0.01.
such that after each toppling all links with uij > µ fail
and are removed, what decreases the degrees ki and kj .
In one time unit each node receives on average one unity
of mass. The final state is reached when all links have
failed.
III. RESULTS
Depending on the failing threshold µ one finds two
different regimes separated by a critical threshold µ∗ in
the thermodynamic limit and separated by a transition
zone µ ≈ µ∗eff for finite lattices. For simplicity, we will
refer to the two regimes only as µ < µ∗ and µ > µ∗.
Let us define the number of links failed during an
avalanche as the avalanche damage d, and its maximum
within the same sample as dmax. For µ < µ
∗, one single
macroscopic avalanche destroys almost every link of the
lattice, i.e., one finds (details below)
for µ < µ∗ : lim
L→∞
dmax
2L2
= 1. (1)
We denote such an avalanche as a devastating avalanche.
Figure 1 (top left) exemplarily shows the time when each
3link fails for one configuration. After the failing of minor
parts due to avalanches with small d, the whole remain-
ing lattice is destroyed at once by one single devastating
avalanche with dmax. Initially links start to fail in one
area and failing then spreads outwards. This can be seen
in Fig. 1 (bottom left) which shows the order of failing
of the links for the same configuration as in Fig. 1 (top
left). Due to the radial propagation of the failing, one
finds a strong long range spatial correlation in the failing
order of links. By contrast, for µ > µ∗, avalanches only
cause the failure of a small number of links, such that
for µ > µ∗ : lim
L→∞
dmax
2L2
= 0. (2)
One observes a short range correlation in failing time and
failing order as seen in Fig. 1 (right).
In the following subsections we will describe both
regimes µ < µ∗ and µ > µ∗ in detail, determine µ∗, in-
vestigate the time of major disconnection, show the role
of the toppling threshold of nodes and the mass incre-
ment added stepwise to the system, and discuss how to
prevent an abrupt collapse. To quantify the process of
disconnection of the nodes, we define the quantity S as
the fraction of nodes belonging to the largest connected
component, such that a fully connected lattice has S = 1
and a fully disconnected one S = 0.
A. Abrupt collapse: µ < µ∗
For µ < µ∗, links only participate in a small number
of avalanches till they fail. The difference in uij of neigh-
boring links remains low till they fail and since the failing
threshold is equal for all links, it is likely that neighbor-
ing links fail due to the same toppling or consecutive
ones. Given that, there are two mechanisms which are
responsible for a devastating avalanche. First, as links
start to fail, the effective degree of the nodes decreases.
The smaller the effective degree of a toppling node, the
more mass is transported through each of its links. So
links are more likely to fail in the neighborhood of a pre-
viously failed link. Second, when an avalanche starts to
destroy many links consecutively, the failing spreads out.
Mass is then accumulated next to the border of the de-
stroyed area triggering many more toppling events and
therefore even further failing of links. These two mecha-
nisms help sustaining the avalanche which therefore leads
to an abrupt collapse of the lattice.
Figure 2 shows the time evolution of the fraction S
of nodes belonging to the largest connected component,
where a discontinuous transition is observed. We denote
tc as the time of the avalanche which leads to the largest
decrease in S. Thus, in the regime µ < µ∗, tc is the time
of the devastating avalanche. This time follows approxi-
mately a Gaussian distribution with a mean and standard
deviation that decrease with L (inset of Fig. 2).
We denote avalanches which occur before the devastat-
ing avalanche as prior avalanches. The avalanche dam-
age probability distribution of prior avalanches does not
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Figure 2. (Color online) Abrupt collapse for low fail-
ing thresholds. For µ < µ∗ (µ = 100) due to a sin-
gle devastating avalanche, the fraction of nodes belonging to
the largest connected component decreases from S ≈ 1 to
S ≈ 0 discontinuously. The time tc when this avalanche
occurs is approximately Gaussian distributed (inset) with
a mean and standard deviation which decrease with L.
For L = {512, 1024, 2048, 4096} the number of samples is
{1000, 250, 125, 25}. ε = 0.01.
change significantly with system size and the largest dam-
age due to a prior avalanche is small compared to the
damage of the devastating avalanche as shown in Fig. 3.
We find for µ = 100 that the fraction of links destroyed
by prior avalanches scales with L−κ, where κ = 1.0±0.1,
and goes to zero in the thermodynamic limit as for all
µ < µ∗. This justifies the limit given by Eq. (1).
To grasp the dynamics as we approach the devastating
avalanche, we investigated the size distribution of prior
avalanches for µ = 100. Long before tc, when no link
failed yet, we observe that the probability p(s) that an
avalanche of size s occurs follows a power-law behavior
p(s) ∼ s−τ with τ ≈ 1 as for the BTW model [14] and
an exponential cutoff at the upper end, as expected in
the presence of dissipation. When t gets closer to tc, the
probability p(s) for s in the range of the cutoff and even
above, where it was practically zero before, increases. By
dividing the avalanches into destructive ones (d > 0) and
non-destructive ones (d = 0), one finds that the increased
probabilities p(s) for large s only comes from destructive
avalanches. This confirms that link failing can amplify
avalanches.
Note that generally link failing can either amplify or
inhibit the strength of avalanches. Even though for the
set of parameters considered here mostly the amplifying
effect dominates, one should nevertheless be aware that
link failing can also stop an avalanche, mainly when after
the failing of links a node, that is about to topple, is
isolated. But the influence of this inhibiting effect is only
noticeable for very low µ and decreases with system size.
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Figure 3. (Color online) Avalanche damage distribu-
tion. Damage probability distributions of prior avalanches
(symbols) with d ≥ 1 and damage due to the devastating
avalanche (dashed lines) for µ < µ∗(µ = 100). Note the gap
between the damage of prior avalanches and the devastating
avalanche. For L = {512, 1024, 2048, 4096} the number of
samples is {1000, 250, 125, 25}. ε = 0.01.
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Figure 4. (Color online) Gradual destruction for high
failing thresholds. For µ > µ∗ (µ = 105) the fraction of
nodes belonging to the largest cluster S decreases continu-
ously in time. tc is the time at which the biggest jump ∆S
due to a single avalanche occurs and follows approximately a
Gaussian (inset) with a mean and standard deviation which
decrease with L. For L = {512, 1024, 2048, 4096} the number
of samples is {1000, 250, 125, 25}. ε = 0.01.
B. Gradual destruction: µ > µ∗
The higher the failing threshold, the more mass trans-
port does it take to destroy a link and the larger will
be the fluctuations in uij of neighboring links when the
links are close to failure. Therefore it is less probable
for higher failing thresholds that neighboring links fail
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Figure 5. (Color online) S versus fraction of failed links.
Fraction of nodes belonging to the largest cluster S versus
fraction of failed links 1−p for µ > µ∗(µ = 105) with dissipa-
tion ε = 0.01. Inset: Scaling of the effective critical thresholds
pc,eff with ν = 4/3 leads to pc = 0.476±0.002 in the thermo-
dynamic limit. For L = {512, 1024, 2048, 4096} the number
of samples is {1000, 250, 125, 25}. ε = 0.01.
in the same avalanche. For µ > µ∗, no avalanche dom-
inates and S decreases gradually with time as shown in
Fig. 4. The largest change in S decreases with the sys-
tem size and the transition is continuous for an infinite
lattice. Again we find that tc is approximately Gaussian
distributed (inset of Fig. 4). In the thermodynamic limit
we find for µ = 105 that tc = 2019.46 ± 0.02 with the
assumption (tc(L)− tc) ∼ L−α with α = 0.87. From the
behavior of S and the second moment of the cluster-size
distribution χ versus the fraction of failed links 1 − p,
where p is the fraction of remaining links, we find that
the transition is in the universality class of random per-
colation with critical exponents ν = 4/3, β = 5/36, and
γ = 43/18. Figure 5 shows S versus 1− p and the effec-
tive critical threshold (pc,eff − pc) ∼ L− 1ν in the inset.
Furthermore we show the finite-size scaling of S and χ in
Fig. 6.
C. At the transition: µ∗
In the regime of abrupt collapse the links destroyed by
the devastating avalanche form a connected cluster that
wraps around the lattice, which we denote as wrapping
damage cluster. One can not find this in the regime of
gradual destruction. Thus, in the thermodynamic limit,
the probability to find a wrapping damage cluster is a
step function at µ = µ∗. We use this fact to find several
estimators for the effective threshold µ∗eff to extrapolate
to the critical threshold µ∗. As µ∗eff we take the value
of µ where the probability to find a wrapping damage
cluster is equal to 1/2. In particular, we use three differ-
ent estimators based on the probability of no wrapping,
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Figure 6. (Color online) Universality class of random
percolation. Finite-size scaling of the second moment of
the cluster size distribution χ and fraction of total nodes be-
longing to the largest cluster S for µ > µ∗(µ = 105). Our
simulation data agrees with the scaling behavior known from
random percolation χL−
γ
ν ∼ L 1ν |p−pc|/pc with χ ∼ |p−pc|−γ
and SL
β
ν ∼ L 1ν |p − pc|/pc with S ∼ (p − pc)β for p > pc re-
spectively S ∼ (pc − p)β−γ for p < pc. For L = {2048, 4096}
the number of samples is {125, 25}. ε = 0.01.
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Figure 7. (Color online) Extrapolation to find the criti-
cal threshold. Extrapolation of different estimators of µ∗eff
for ε = 0.01 and η = 0.34 ± 0.01. Linear regressions (lines)
for L = {1024, 2058, 4096} (solid symbols). Significant devi-
ation is observed for small system sizes L = {128, 256, 512}
(open symbols). Error bars are below 0.6%. Inset: values of
µ∗ for ε = {0.01, 0.02} and a guide to the eyes (solid line)
with the upper limit of dissipation ε = 0.30 ± 0.01 where
one only observes a devastating avalanche for µ = 0. For
L = {128, 256, 512, 1024, 2048, 4096}, measurements were per-
formed in steps of ∆µ = 10 with number of samples being
{3 · 104, 3 · 104, 7500, 8000, 1200, 500}.
Figure 8. (Color online) Devastating avalanche in the
worst case scenario. First three steps of the devastating
avalanche when initially all nodes have mass zi = z
′
c < zc,
where z′c is arbitrarily close to zc, and links fail after the first
transport (µ = 0). Every node that receives mass topples and
every link used is removed.
wrapping along only one direction (1D-wrapping), and
wrapping in both directions (2D-wrapping). We assume
that all three estimators of µ∗eff scale with lattice size as
L−η, with the same η > 0 and find the best value for η
such that the linear fitting µ∗eff = µ
∗ + cL−η intercepts
the origin at the same value µ∗ for different estimators.
For dissipation ε = 0.01 we find η = 0.34 ± 0.01 which
results in µ∗ = 146 ± 6 as seen in Fig. 7. For dissipa-
tion ε = 0.02 we find η = 0.29 ± 0.01 with µ∗ = 48 ± 1.
With increasing dissipation, the transition between a dis-
continuous abrupt collapse and a gradual destruction is
shifted to lower µ and for ε > 0.30± 0.01 no devastating
avalanche is observed even for µ = 0 as seen in the inset
of Fig. 7.
For finite systems the used estimators for the effective
critical thresholds µ∗eff are upper bounds to µ
∗ as seen
in Fig. 7. By checking for a wrapping damage cluster
one can not give a lower bound for µ∗, but we found a
different approach to do so. We analyze how powerful
devastating avalanches are for a certain lattice size and
out of this predict if such an avalanche would evolve to
be powerful enough to destroy an infinite system. If we
find that also an infinite system would collapse abruptly,
we have found a lower bound for µ∗. We quantify the
power of an avalanche in the following way. Let the first
toppling of an avalanche be its first step l = 1. At each
step l, all nodes with mass zi ≥ zc topple. We define the
power Ψl as the total massMl on toppling nodes divided
by the number of toppling nodes Nl at step l, i.e.,
Ψl =
Ml
Nl . (3)
For a devastating avalanche to occur in an infinite sys-
tem, its power needs to grow to a level at which its further
progress is guaranteed. Such an avalanche will reach a
constant level of power, at which mass accumulation due
6to the spreading of link failure balances out the suppres-
sion by dissipation. To clarify this, we discuss in detail
the worst case scenario, i.e., where links fail after the first
passage of mass (µ = 0) and where initially all nodes are
filled completely, i.e., zi = z
′
c < zc, where z
′
c = zc − δ,
and δ → 0. The first increment of mass ∆z = 1 will lead
to a toppling since z′c + ∆z ≥ zc, such that at step l = 1,
as seen in Fig. 8 (left), we have
M1 = z′c + ∆z,
N1 = 1,
Ψ1 =
M1
N1 = z
′
c + ∆z.
(4)
Fig. 8 (middle) shows how after the toppling of this first
node, all its links are removed (since µ = 0) and all its
neighbors topple at step l = 2. The total mass on top-
pling nodes at l = 2 is equal to the mass (1 − ε)M1
shed from the first toppled node plus the mass N2z′c that
beforehand was on the nodes, i.e.
M2 = (1− ε)M1 +N2z′c,
N2 = 4. (5)
We can now express Ψ2 as
Ψ2 =
M2
N2 =
(1− ε)M1 +N2z′c
N2
= (1− ε)Ψ1N1N2 + z
′
c.
(6)
From this we find the iterative formula for l > 2
Ψl|l>2 = (1− ε)ΨlNl−1Nl + z
′
c, (7)
where the number of toppling nodes increases by four
each step (compare l = 2 and l = 3 in Fig. 8), i.e.,
Nl|l>1 = 4(l − 1). (8)
We are only interested in the limit l → ∞ and we use
that for l 1
Nl−1
Nl =
4(l − 2)
4(l − 1) ≈ 1, (9)
and simplify Eq. (7) to
Ψl = (1− ε)Ψl−1 + z′c. (10)
One finds that Ψl converges to its fixed point
Ψl
l→∞−−−→ z
′
c
ε
<
zc
ε
, (11)
i.e., the most devastating avalanche reaches a constant
power-level strictly smaller than zc/ε.
For finite size lattices we are only interested in the
power for 1 ≤ l ≤ L/2, where we are sure that the
avalanche does not interact with itself wrapping around
the lattice. In simulations for µ < µ∗ we observe that
the power of the devastating avalanche averaged over
many configurations has a phase of super-linear increase
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Figure 9. (Color online) Predicting a lower bound for
the critical threshold. Our measure ∆ for super-linear
growth versus µ for L = 512, averaged over 105 samples. With
a statistical test (Z-test) which assumes with the so called null
hypothesisH0 that ∆ is Gaussian distributed with mean ∆0 =
0 and standard deviation equal to the average standard error
of the data σ0 = 0.0154, one expects ∆ ≥ 0.0358 (see dashed
line) only with probability 0.01. For µ ≤ 130 we detect that
there is significant super-linear growth in power (∆ = 0.0658
for µ = 130 and probability < 10−5 that ∆ ≥ 0.0658 under
H0). Inset: Power Ψl of devastating avalanche versus step
l for µ = 50 averaged over 105 samples. Tangent to Ψl at
the first inflection point l = 87 (dashed), fitted in the region
74 ≤ l ≤ 100 (vertical dotted lines). Independently of µ,
we define ∆ as the difference at l = L/2 between Ψl and
its tangent, where the tangent is incident to Ψl at l = 87.
ε = 0.01.
as shown for µ = 50 in the inset of Fig. 9. This shows that
the rate of mass accumulation increases and the positive
feedback of link failure gets stronger. The power of these
avalanches will increase up to where dissipation balances
out with mass accumulation, as discussed before. Every
µ for which we can detect this super-linear power increase
serves therefore as a lower bound for µ∗. We define
∆ = ΨL/2 − Ψ˜(L/2), (12)
where Ψ˜(l) is the tangent to Ψl that is incident at l = 87
which is the first inflection point of Ψl for µ = 50 (see
dashed line in the inset of Fig. 9). We show for L =
512 in Fig. 9 that there is significant super-linear growth
detectable by means of ∆ for µ ≤ 130 which agrees with
our previously determined value µ∗ = 146± 6.
D. Time of major disconnection: tc
The time tc, at which the largest decrease in S due to a
single avalanche occurs (abrupt collapse for µ < µ∗), can
be used to know when the network is connected (t < tc)
or disconnected (t > tc). It is therefore of interest how
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Figure 10. (Color online) Time tc of the biggest jump
∆S due to a single avalanche. tc is well fitted by a
linear relation to µ, except for very low µ (see the ampli-
fication in the inset at the upper left). Lower right inset:
Not detectable by eye, the residuals of linear fits of tc of
a particular system size (L = {512, 2048} as examples) re-
veal that the function tc(µ) is super-linear below the tran-
sition failing threshold µ∗eff and sub-linear above. Verti-
cal lines bound the estimated range of µ∗eff (compare Fig.
7) which includes the inflection point (linear extrapolations
from the estimation range help to verify that by eye). tc was
measured at µ = {0, 5, . . . , 295, 300, 350, . . . , 950, 1000} and
for L = {128, 256, 512, 1024, 2048} the number of samples is
{1600, 800, 400, 200, 100}. ε = 0.01.
tc scales with µ and L. We find that tc depends weakly
on L but is quite well fitted by a linear relation with µ
(see Fig. 10). At first sight unnoticeable, the residuals
of linear fits of tc for a particular system size reveal that
for every L the function tc(µ) is super-linear below the
effective critical threshold µ∗eff of that system size and
sub-linear above. Since µ∗eff varies with L as seen in Fig.
7, the dependence of tc on L changes with µ and can not
be described in a simple way. Note that we found for the
range of system sizes considered here that for µ & 200
the difference between tc for different L decreases with
increasing µ in absolute value.
E. Role of toppling threshold zc and mass
increment ∆z
So far, we fixed the amount of mass ∆z = 1 added
stepwise to the system and the toppling threshold zc = 4
of nodes. One might wonder what is the influence of these
parameters. ∆z, zc, and the failing threshold µ are not
independent, and so we decided to express everything
in terms of ∆z and end up with the two adimensional
variables zc/∆z and µ/∆z, and measure time as t/∆z.
Thus changing ∆z to ∆z′ = k∆z has the same effect as
leaving ∆z unchanged but choose z′c = zc/k and µ
′ =
µ/k. For simplicity, we fix ∆z = 1 and only investigate
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Figure 11. (Color online) Influence of the toppling
threshold zc. The critical failing threshold µ
∗ increases with
zc. Here we show one estimation of µ
∗
eff (2D-wrapping, com-
pare Fig. 7) versus zc. To find µ
∗
eff , 1000 samples each were
measured in steps of 0.5 ≤ ∆µ ≤ 50 depending on µ. Error
bars below 2%. Lower right inset: Finite size scaling of ex-
ponent b of the power law fitting µ∗eff ∼ zbc for 0.4 ≤ zc ≤ 6.
Error bars below the size of the symbols. With different es-
timations of µ∗eff we predict µ
∗ ∼ zcbc with bc = 1.8 ± 0.1,
under the assumption (b− bc) ∼ L−ζ and 0.1 < ζ < 1. In the
plot ζ = 0.5. Upper left inset: tc versus zc for µ = 500 and
L = {128, 1024} (number of samples is {100, 50}, error bars
below 1%). tc is nonsensitive to changes in zc for zc / 5, i.e.,
zc  µ. ε = 0.01.
the influence of zc.
When analyzing the sensitivity of the effective thresh-
olds µ∗eff , we find that µ
∗
eff ∼ zcb as seen in Fig. 11
and with a size dependence analysis for 0.4 ≤ zc ≤ 6
(lower right inset of Fig. 11) we estimate that the critical
threshold
µ∗ ∼ zcbc (13)
with bc = 1.8± 0.1, obtained under the assumption (b−
bc) ∼ L−ζ and 0.1 < ζ < 1.
In general, we find that
µ∗
∆z
∼
( zc
∆z
)bc
, (14)
and thus,
µ∗ ∼ zbcc ∆z1−bc . (15)
To drive the system away from an abrupt collapse, one
can, for example, lower µ∗ while keeping µ constant.
From Eq. (15) we can directly see that since bc > 1, both
decreasing zc and increasing ∆z will move the system
away from an abrupt collapse.
The time tc is robust to changes in zc and ∆z for
zc/∆z / 5, but not for larger zc/∆z as seen in the upper-
left inset of Fig. 11 for µ = 500 and ∆z = 1. For some
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Figure 12. (Color online) Dispersed failing thresholds
can prevent an abrupt collapse. Behavior of S versus
time for Gaussian distributed failing thresholds with mean
µ = 100 and standard deviations σ = {1, 2, 10} for L = 4096
(averaged over 25 samples). An abrupt collapse is still seen
for σ = 1 but not for σ = {2, 10}. ε = 0.01.
very large zc, where it only needs a few transportation
through each link to fail it, the inhibiting effect of link
failing can become relevant and therefore we can see an
increase in tc. However, this is a finite-size effect. To
give an impression of the inhibiting effect of link failing,
let us consider the value zc = 1050 where we find the
highest peak (measurements in steps of ∆zc = 50 around
this point). In that case the mass transported through
links is often such that it takes only two topplings from
any of the two nodes connected together to fail the link.
Thus many links often transport mass only once forth and
back (often during the same avalanche) before they fail
and therefore mass often ends up on isolated nodes. This
can only prevent a devastating avalanche in small enough
system sizes since with increasing system size the prob-
ability to overcome this inhibiting barrier at one point
to start a devastating avalanche increases and therefore
loses relevance on the large scale.
F. Preventing an abrupt collapse
To avoid an abrupt collapse it is crucial to reduce
the empowering effect that damaging events have on
avalanches. Increasing the failing threshold of links leads
to larger fluctuations in usage at the time of failing and
reduces the probability of simultaneous failing of neigh-
boring links. We have seen how the toppling threshold
and the mass increment added stepwise to the system
influence its behavior and that both decreasing the top-
pling threshold and increasing the mass increment drive
the system away from an abrupt collapse.
Another possibility to prevent an abrupt collapse is the
use of a heterogeneous distribution of link thresholds. In
Fig. 12 we show that if one uses normally distributed
failing thresholds with a mean of µ = 100 < µ∗, we still
observe an abrupt collapse for a small standard deviation
of the links of σ = 1 but already a gradual destruction
for σ = 2. One can think of many other modifications
which might also suppress a devastating avalanche such
as limiting the transport capacity of links or the toppling
outflow of nodes, introducing a progressive rate of dissi-
pation, or letting links fail immediately during a trans-
portation such that part of the outflow of the toppling
node is sent back or is redistributed.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Although the size of cascades is limited by an expo-
nential cutoff distribution in the absence of link failure,
we observed that due to the positive feedback of link
failures a macroscopic devastating avalanche occurs for
failing thresholds below a critical level. To avoid a global
catastrophe, it is therefore crucial to suppress positive
feedback of failures. We showed with our model that not
only dispersed failing thresholds can prevent an abrupt
collapse but also to decrease the toppling threshold of the
nodes and to increase the mass increment added stepwise
to the system.
Our prediction of a lower bound for the critical thresh-
old shows that when studying cascading phenomena in
general, investigating not only the size and total damage
of destructive events but also their step-wise evolution
can be of valuable insight. That will also shed light on
the behavior of supercritical events in large systems from
simulations of rather small ones.
Future work might explore this model on other network
topologies as for example networks obtained from real
data. As an extension, one could allow network elements
to recover from usage or even rebuild them after failing to
evaluate possible recovering policies. Additionally, since
often network elements fail due to extensive use during a
short time, such as in electrical grids or the Internet, it
would be important to investigate a version of the model
where the failing threshold limits the allowed use of links
or nodes per time interval, avalanche, or certain number
of consecutive topplings. If and how strong failures are
self-sustaining will tell how different limitations trigger
or suppress an abrupt collapse of the network and might
lead to new strategies to suppress catastrophic events in
networks in general.
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